Market power, dismissal threat and rent sharing
An edition of Market power, dismissal threat and rent sharing (2006)
the role of insider and outsider forces in wage bargaining
By Anabela Carneiro
Publish Date
2006
Publisher
IZA
Language
eng
Pages
-
Description:
"One of the predictions of the insider-outsider theory is that wages will be higher in sectors (firms) with high labor adjustment costs/high turnover costs. This prediction is tested empirically in this study, using an insider-outsider model and a longitudinal panel of large firms in Portugal. The results revealed that firms where insider workers appear to have more market power tend to pay higher wages. In particular, we found that the threat of dismissal acts to weaken insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, to restrain their wage claims. Moreover, the results also showed that real wages in Portugal are downward rigid"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
subjects: Wage bargaining, Wages
Places: Portugal