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International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard

International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard

By Prasanna Gai

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Publish Date

2004

Publisher

Bank of England

Language

eng

Pages

-

Description:

"In this paper the question of whether recent international policy initiatives to facilitate financial rescues in emerging market countries have influenced debtors' incentives to access official sector resources is examined. A country's systemic importance is highlighted as a key characteristic that drives access to official sector finance. The effect of these policy initiatives on IMF programme participation is estimated using a pooled probit model. The safety net implied by policy changes to permit exceptional access is shown to have a greater marginal impact on the use of official sector resources, the more systemically important the debtor country is. The paper's results can be interpreted as offering some support for the presence of debtor-country moral hazard"--Bank of England web site.